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ABSTRACT
After the existing Tempe Town Lake downstream dam failed unexpectedly in 2010, the City of Tempe, AZ, USA was
tasked with designing and constructing a replacement dam to maintain their lake, pass flows in the ephemeral Salt
River, and deliberately lower water levels to avert flooding. Through an alternatives evaluation process, a
hydraulically operated steel gate system was selected from a field of twenty studied alternative configurations to
replace the existing rubber bladder system.
The gate design produced eight 32.3 meter (106 foot) long, 6.4 meter (21 foot) tall, and 118,000 kilogram (260,000
pound) steel gates operated by single-acting hydraulic cylinders and powered by a power unit featuring two 1,893
cm3/s (30 gpm) axial piston pumps, each powered by a 37 kW (50 hp) motor. With local and remote monitoring and
control capability, the system is designed to control the gates under automatic or manual control mode.
The design also includes a foundation seepage control and collection system using a cement-bentonite cutoff wall
and drainage blanket; a scour wall; a stilling basin designed to accommodate variable crest elevations;
instrumentation and controls designed to maintain the recreational lake while preventing unintended flooding; and
an operations, maintenance, and dam monitoring plan all designed to maintain dam safety, avert flooding, and
preserve the City of Tempe’s valuable resource, Tempe Town Lake.
This paper presents the selection, approach, challenges, and results of designing the hydraulically operated steel
crest gate system designed to maintain Tempe Town Lake and deliberately lower it to avert flooding.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Salt River was historically a perennial river providing water to the Phoenix valley for agriculture, the Hayden
Flour Mill and Hayden Ferry, refuge during the hot summer months, and an unpredictable flooding hazard.
Beginning in the early 1900s, construction of Roosevelt Dam on the upper Salt River reduced flows in the river
through the valley (City of Tempe, 2015) and started a shift in the river dynamics, which eventually resulted in the
current ephemeral river. With five (5) dams eventually constructed upstream of the City of Tempe, the Salt River
became a dry river bed attracting landfills, quarry mining, and industrial businesses (City of Tempe, 2015).
In 1966, a design competition at Arizona State University’s College of Architecture envisioned an inland seaport
concept along the Salt River (City of Tempe, 2015) that began a series of studies, an advisory commission, funding
support, master planning, and eventually the design and construction of the 0.89 km2 (220-acre) Tempe Town Lake.
The lake was opened in 1999, anchored by a downstream dam consisting of four rubber bladders (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Tempe Town Lake
The investment paid off as the urban lake spurred development, recreation, and outdoor activities such as boating,
jogging, biking, the Ironman Arizona triathlon, festivals, concerts, and fishing.
In 2010, one of the bladders failed unexpectedly resulting in the loss of the lake and its nearly 3,750 m3 (one billion
gallons) of water. The original bladders had an expected design life of 20 years, but early signs of distress were
observed, which initiated their replacement after 10 years. Because the City was already in the process of replacing
the bladders when the failure occurred, restoring the valuable asset only took three months after the failure. An
independent analysis attributed failure to intra-carcass pressurization of the bladder, which was accelerated by
climatic conditions of the desert southwest. The bladder manufacturer provided the replacement bladders under a
five-year lease agreement, after which they must be removed. The City was tasked with finding a replacement
option and removing the existing rubber bladders by the end of the bladder lease period. Through an alternative
evaluation process, design, and construction, the City is near completion of a replacement dam to preserve Tempe
Town Lake and the value it brings to the community.

2. ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION
The alternative evaluation process identified “must have” and “should have” evaluation criteria and potential dam
replacement technologies. “Must have” criteria are considered essential to the acceptable performance of the project
while “should have” criteria represents important desired characteristics (Gannett Fleming, 2012). The criteria are
summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of Final Project Criteria
Must Have Project Criteria
Safety
Maintain or improve current level of flood protection
Minimize the reduction in flood passage capacity
Minimize the increase in flood impacts to surrounding areas
Ability to capture the tail end of a flood event to maintain the full lake condition during higher frequency events
Maintain structural integrity of the dam under maximum design discharge
Reliably lowered when needed
Design must be compatible with pedestrian bridge and immediate surrounding area
Meet the December 28, 2015 bladder lease end date
High degree of reliability
Meets regulatory requirements
Maximize value (cost/benefit)
Demonstrated performance in this climatic environment
Should Have Project Criteria
Ability to capture the tail end of a flood event to maintain the full lake condition following design flood
Minimize operations and maintenance costs
Simplicity of operation
Proven technology
Design that allows the lake to be maintained during construction
Maintain current lake bottom grade
Minimize downstream scour
Vandalism prevention
Maintain original design lake level
Minimize environmental impacts
Aesthetically compatible
Maintain the existing pier configuration and minimize structural modifications as much as possible
An initial list of twenty alternative configurations were evaluated and eventually reduced down to four viable
alternatives, as the other sixteen did not meet the “must have” criteria or had other fatal flaws. The alternatives and
their respective fatal flaw(s) are in Table 2.
Of the twenty configurations, the pneumatically operated hinge crest gates (Obermeyer); hydraulically/cable
operated steel gate; dyrhoff rubber dams (Sumitomo); and fusegates (Hydroplus) were carried forward for additional
analysis. The fusegate was soon after eliminated due to operational limitations. The team more thoroughly
evaluated the remaining three alternatives, including performing a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to
identify potential failure modes associated with the foundation and the structure (gate). Through the FMEA process,
four credible failure modes were identified that impacted the designs. Comparative capital construction and life
cycle costs were then performed to assist with the alternative selection. Both the downstream Obermeyer and
downstream hydraulically operated steel gates were recommended as feasible alternatives to replace the existing
rubber bladders. The hydraulically operated steel gates system was eventually selected primarily due to durability
concerns of the rubber air bladders used for both the rubber bladder dam and Obermeyer’s gates.

Table 2. Summary of Project Alternatives
Alternative
Inflatable dams (water-filled)
Ogee crest weirs
Labyrinth weirs
Bridgestone dual body rubber dams
Radial gates (tainter gates)
Vertical lift gates
Swing gates
Bottom hinge crest gates (Balscule gate)
Collapsible Fusegates (Hydroplus Folding Fusegate)
Earth Embankment/Fuse Plug
Combined concrete outer dams with inner gates
Combined half-height concrete dam with crest gates
Combined labyrinth weir outer dam with inner gates
Fuse plugs of various configurations (Hydroplus)
Pneumatically operated hinge crest gates (Obermeyer) 30
meters (100 feet) downstream of existing dam
Obermeyer hinge crest gates between existing piers
Hydraulically operated hinged crest gates 30 meters (100
feet) downstream of existing dam
Hydraulically operated hinged crest gates between existing
piers with 1 addition pier per span
Hydraulically operated hinged crest gates between existing
piers with 2 addition pier per span
Dyrhoff rubber dams (Sumitomo)

Initial Evaluation Status
Fatal flaw (safety and operational constraints)
Fatal flaw (hydraulic and sediment constraints)
Fatal flaw (hydraulic and sediment constraints)
Fatal flaw (no longer available)
Fatal flaw (flood control criteria)
Fatal flaw (cost)
Fatal flaw (ineffective at capturing tailwater)
Fatal flaw (flood control criteria)
Fatal flaw (ineffective at capturing tailwater)
Fatal flaw (poor performance and reliability)
Fatal flaw (flood control criteria)
Fatal flaw (flood control criteria)
Fatal flaw (flood control criteria)

3. DESIGN
After selecting the hydraulically operated steel gate system as the replacement alternative, the design process began
by siting the dam across the Salt River and modeling its impacts to the floodway. Detailed design could not
commence until the siting satisfied the following three “must have” criteria related to flood protection: maintain or
improve current level of flood protection; minimize the reduction in flood passage capacity; and minimize the
increase in flood impacts to surrounding areas.
During the 60 percent design phase, the contractor was procured for constructability reviews, cost estimations, and
early involvement as the design progressed. The design of the steel gates was accomplished through the preparation
of a performance specification used to procure the gate vendor after the 60 percent design phase of the dam. Once
the gate vendor was on board, the steel gate design was completed concurrent with the final design of the
foundation, superstructure, and supporting facilities. See Figure 2 for a rendering of the replacement dam.

Figure 2. Replacement Dam Rendering

3.1. Design Flood Analysis
Maintaining or improving the current level of flood protection and minimizing the increase in flood impacts to
surrounding areas are “must have” design criteria. For this section of the Salt River, the City of Tempe and the
Flood Control District of Maricopa County (FCDMC) manage the river and its levees for a reach capacity of 5,947
m3/s (210,000 ft3/s) and a 100-year flow of 4,786 m3/s (169,000 ft3/s). The addition of the new dam must minimize
increases in upstream water surface elevations during the design events over what would occur under the existing
condition. Hydraulic modelling was performed using the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) computer
program, HEC-RAS (version 4.1) to estimate the design flow inundation limits and corresponding levee freeboard
heights. An iterative approach was used for establishing the elevation of the concrete superstructure and the spacing
and width of the concrete piers (Gannett Fleming, 2014). The team evaluated factors such as river hydraulics,
operational considerations, structural limitations, gate size limitations, and costs. The results produced a
superstructure elevation of 344.7 meters (1131 feet) above mean sea level supporting seven new piers spaced to
receive eight identical gates, each 32.3 meters (106 feet) long and 6.4 meters (21 feet) tall. For the design events,
the proposed structure increases the water surface elevation approximately 0.3 meters (1.0 foot) at the new dam.
The change in water surface elevation decreases upstream of the new dam to zero net increase approximately 4.8
kilometers (3 miles) upstream from the new dam. The HEC-RAS modeling indicates the increase in water surface
elevations are still contained within the existing levees and still meet the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(FEMA’s) 100-year freeboard requirements. FEMA requires that the 100-year peak flow condition maintain a
minimum of 0.9 meters (3 feet) of freeboard where there are no structures and a minimum of 1.2 meters (4 feet) of
freeboard at bridges and/or culvert structures (FEMA, 2012). Figure 3 illustrates the estimated increase in water
surface elevation due to the construction of the new dam.

Figure 3. Water Surface Elevation Increase Due to the New Downstream Dam

3.2. Foundation and Superstructure
The steel gates are supported by a 15.2 meter (50 foot) wide by 6.1 meter (20 foot) deep structure consisting of a
roller-compacted concrete foundation founded on “basin fill” material and a reinforced concrete superstructure.
Seepage through the foundation is controlled with a cement-bentonite cutoff wall that extends to bedrock; an
extension of the lake’s existing shoreline cutoff walls; a conventional concrete facing system integral with the rollercompacted concrete foundation; and a seepage collection system. The seepage collection system under the dam and
stilling basin consists of a drainage blanket and perforated drain pipes. See Figure 4 for the typical section.

Figure 4. Typical Section
Loading conditions and target factors of safety for dam foundation sliding and stability were developed based on
guidance from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gravity Dam Design (EM 1110-2-2200); the USACE
Design of Hydraulic Steel Structures (ETL 1110-2-584); and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
(Gannett Fleming, 2014). Table 3 is a summary of the loading conditions and their respective factor of safety.

Table 3. Summary of Sliding and Stability Factors of Safety
Gate
Upstream WSE*
Load
Factor of
Position
m (ft)
Condition
Safety
Normal Pool
Closed
349.9 (1148.0)
Usual
2.0
Flood Discharge
Closed
350.5 (1150.0)
Unusual
1.7
Normal Pool plus 1 coffer dam
Closed
349.9 (1148.0)
Unusual
1.7
Normal Pool with Seismic
Closed
349.9 (1148.0)
Unusual
1.7
Normal Pool with 2 coffer dams
Closed
349.9 (1148.0)
Extreme
1.3
Flood Discharge with 2 coffer dams
Closed
350.5 (1150.0)
Extreme
1.3
Normal Pool with Seismic and 1 Cofferdam
Closed
349.9 (1148.0)
Extreme
1.3
Flood Discharge with Seismic
Closed
350.5 (1150.0)
Extreme
1.3
Flood Discharge with 1 Cofferdam and Seismic
Closed
350.5 (1150.0) Ultra-Extreme
1.1
Flood Discharge with Full Downstream Scour
Closed
350.5 (1150.0) Ultra-Extreme
1.1
* Water Surface Elevation (WSE) above mean sea level, SI Units (English Units)
Additional loading conditions were evaluated to establish the maximum cylinder loads used for the structural design
of the concrete piers and concrete superstructure. For all conditions evaluated, a conservative “no tailwater
condition” downstream of the gates was assumed. An upstream water surface elevation of 350.5 m (1150 ft) was
also conservatively assumed as it also generates loads greater than the maximum water surface elevation of 349.9 m
(1148 ft) the gate’s control programming and standard operating procedures are designed to maintain. Table 4
summarizes the various loading conditions and their respective maximum cylinder forces.
Table 4. Summary of Cylinder Design Loading Conditions

Upstream WSE*
Gate Position and Loading Condition
m (ft)
Closed with no overtopping (normal pool)
349.9 (1148.0)
Closed with 0.6 m (2 ft) of overtopping & drawdown
350.5 (1150.0)
Closed with 0.3 m (1 ft) of overtopping & debris loading
350.2 (1149.0)
25% open with WSE at 350.5 (1150.0) & drawdown
350.5 (1150.0)
50% open with WSE at 350.5 (1150.0) & drawdown
350.5 (1150.0)
50% open with WSE at 350.5 (1150.0) & no drawdown
350.5 (1150.0)
75% open with WSE at 350.5 (1150.0) & drawdown
350.5 (1150.0)
100% open with WSE at 350.5 (1150.0) & drawdown
350.5 (1150.0)
* Water Surface Elevation (WSE) above mean sea level, SI Units (English Units)

Drawdown
WSE* at Crest
m (ft)
349.9 (1148.0)
350.3 (1149.4)
350.2 (1149.0)
350.1 (1148.5)
349.1 (1145.3)
350.5 (1150.0)
347.7 (1140.8)
346.6 (1137.3)

Cylinder Force
kN (kip)
1,139 (256)
1,379 (310)
1,437 (323)
1,459 (328)
1,441 (324)
1,753 (394)
1,681 (378)
1,459 (328)

The structural design of the concrete piers and concrete superstructure is based on the maximum calculated cylinder
force of 1,753 kN (394 kip) and further checked against a cylinder force of 2,224 kN (500 kip). The hydraulic
cylinders are designed for a bearing capacity of 2,002 kN (450 kip) at a safety factor of two. The reinforced
concrete design was performed in accordance with the American Concrete Institute Manual of Standard Practice for
Detailing Reinforced Concrete Structures (ACI Committee 315).

3.3. Stilling Basin
Similar to the design loads, the stilling basin design had to consider variable gate positions and variable water
surface elevations produced by the normal operation of the gates. Gate operational flexibility affords the City several
benefits such as
 reducing scour potential at the abutments by releasing flow over the center gates first;
 maximizing the efficiency of the stilling basin and downstream scour protection by releasing flow
uniformly over all eight gates;




managing the depth over the gate(s) while maintaining the normal pool elevation by releasing flows over a
single gate or any combination of multiple gates; and
accommodating certain gates that are out of service or downstream areas that are under repair by releasing
flows over select gates.

The stilling basin for the new dam is designed based on guidance from USACE Hydraulic Design of Navigation
Dams (EM 1110-2-1605). Due to the operational and geometric variability, the stilling basin was first designed
assuming all eight gates are lowered uniformly. The nappe profiles generated by the uniform operation of all eight
gates at variable crest elevations are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Evaluation of Under-Nappe Profiles for Varying Crest Elevations
After the stilling basin design was complete, alternative operational scenarios were evaluated to understand how the
basin would perform under variable gate operations. The evaluations indicate adequate performance with up to
approximately 0.6 meters (2 feet) over any gate or subset of gates (i.e. any combination of up to seven of the gates).
In the event that additional discharge capacity is required that exceeds 0.6 meters (2 feet) of overtopping, all eight
gates are lowered uniformly until the required discharge capacity is met. The operational programming is designed
to manage the overtopping depth, and the Operations and Maintenance Manual provides further guidelines for
optimizing the effectiveness of the stilling basin.

3.4. Gate Control Instrumentation and Alarms
Maintaining the desired pool elevation is important for users that depend on the numerous lake marinas and the City
of Tempe. Of greater importance is the pool level monitoring for safe and effective operation of the gates. Incorrect
readings or delayed gate operation could lead to undesirable dam loading conditions, overtopping of the levees, and
possibly the flooding of Tempe.
The electrical control system uses a programmable logic controller (PLC) system to monitor and control digital and
analog Input/Output (I/O) signals (Gannett Fleming, 2015). Instrumentation system components are interconnected
with a fiber optic communication network for protection against electrical transients, which mitigates the need for
surge protection devices at both ends of the outdoor wired signal runs (Gannett Fleming, 2015). Four ultrasonic
level transmitters are provided to measure and report the pool level. Transmitters are provided at both the north and
south sides of the lake to account for differential levels that may exist because of wind effects and for redundancy.
Each location includes two transmitters for added redundancy. The level signal is a primary control signal, so its
integrity is important for correct dam operation. The safety controller compares the paired level signals at either
side of the lake to verify their reliability, allowing the controller to detect a false condition while not interrupting the
control readings. To help prevent unwanted loading conditions, flow depths over the gates are monitored and an

alarm is generated when the depth exceeds 0.6 meters (2 feet), and an additional alarm is generated when the depth
reaches 1.7 meters (5.6 feet). When flow depths over the gates exceeds 1.7 meters (5.6 feet), a countdown ensues
before the control system lowers the gates automatically. Also, timers in the programming proof signals before
automatic control adjustments are made. The transmitters are located 61 meters (200 feet) upstream of the gates so
that readings are taken outside the water surface drawdown profile. For additional protection and to help prevent
overtopping of the levees, separate high level alarm floats are located at the north and south abutments to detect an
emergency high-level condition should the pool level reach elevation 350.5 meters (1150.0 feet), 0.6 meters (2 feet)
above the normal pool elevation of 349.9 meters (1148 feet). The high alarm level floats are also in pairs for
redundancy, which also increases the reliability and accuracy of a high level detection. Manual backup to the pool
level instruments is provided by a staff gauge at the northernmost pier (no. 7) and by a staff gauge on the north
abutment wall. The gauges can be read directly by an operator from the control building, upstream pedestrian
bridge, or north abutment area.
To monitor the hydraulic cylinders’ status, they are equipped with temperature sensors, proximity switches, and oil
leak detectors. Alarms are generated when the cylinder oil temperatures reach a predetermined warning temperature
set point and eventually lock out operation of the corresponding gate when temperatures exceed a set temperature.
Two hydraulic oil leak pressure transmitters monitor for a cylinder tube seal leak at the interstitial space between the
primary rod end seal and the secondary outboard end seal. The proximity switch alarms are designed to monitor
when the gates have reached the fully closed position or the fully open position to prevent the hydraulic power unit
(HPU) pumps and valves from staying energized longer than necessary.
Each gate position is monitored by a Rittmeyer RIVERT angle transmitter providing a continuous feedback signal of
the gates angle and corresponding crest elevation. When the continuous feedback signal does not match a
corresponding command for a pre-determined amount of time, alarms are generated and the corresponding gate(s)
are locked out of operation for any automatic mode operation. The corresponding gate(s) may still be operated in
manual mode if it is determined that the alarm is a result of a sensor failure. These alarms and safety features are
designed to prevent racking of the gates and extreme loads for scenarios such as binding at the hinges, debris
blockage, or other adverse conditions.
The HPU is equipped with over twenty automatic monitoring capabilities designed for operational and alarm
functions. From simple pump/motor running status readings to the hydraulic oil cleanliness and water content
readings, the HPU’s status is well monitored to help maintain proper function.

3.5. Hydraulic Power Unit and Cylinders
The gates are held by 6.9 meter (274 inch) stroke and 40.6 centimeter (16 inch) bore single-acting cylinders that are
powered by a 152 bar (2,200 psi) hydraulic power unit (HPU) featuring two 1,893 cm3/s (30 gpm) axial piston
pumps, each powered by a 37 kW (50 hp) motor. The dual-pump system provides redundancy to the operation of
the gates in the event that a pump or motor is out of commission. Supported by a separate 19,700 liter (5,200 gal)
hydraulic fluid reservoir, the system is designed to lower all eight gates through full stroke within 30 minutes and
raise all eight gates through full stroke within 120 minutes. The HPU delivers Mobil EALTM hydraulic oil to the
cylinders by schedule 40 Type 304 stainless steel hydraulic lines. Accessibility to the 1,980 meters (6,500 feet) of
hydraulic piping is important to facilitate scheduled inspections for leaks, damage, or other conditions that could
impact the operation of the gates. To help facility inspections and maintenance, 90 percent of hydraulic piping is
accessible within a concrete trench protected by either a fiber reinforced polymer (FRP) cover or a reinforced
concrete cover. The remaining 10 percent of piping is sleeved within the piers where they can be removed and
replaced if necessary.
The single-acting cylinders allow passive lowering of the gates, which is an important design approach in the
riverine condition where debris can accumulate around the gates. The Salt River can produce heavy sediment and
debris conditions during prolonged flow events. The passive lowering of the gates prevents inducing compressive
forces in the cylinders in the event of debris blockage.

3.6. Structure Instrumentation and Monitoring
In addition to the instrumentation and monitoring for the gate operation, the dam structure and hydrostatic
conditions are monitored with structural monitoring points and piezometers. A total of six piezometers are located
downstream of the gates: two near the left abutment at Gate #1; two near the center of the dam; and two near the
right abutment at Gate #8. Each set of two piezometers includes one that extends into the drainage layer and one
that extends below the RCC foundation to elevation 335.3 (1100.0). The piezometers are vibrating wire-type
piezometers and feed into the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system where the data is stored and
accessible through the controls readout screen. Survey prisms are located on each pier for measuring horizontal
movements of the dam over time. In addition, brass surface monuments are located immediately downstream of the
piers in the stilling basin area to allow level measurements to track vertical movements of the dam and foundation.

4. DESIGN CHALLENGES
4.1. Schedule and Permitting
By the time the dam replacement alternative was selected, the City had three and one-half years left in their schedule
to design and construct the hydraulically operated steel gate dam. To help expedite construction, phased design
packages were created and permitted to allow early construction for site preparation work and foundation work.
This allowed more time for final design of the gates, superstructure, and supporting facilities.

4.2. Gate Buoyancy
Crest gates typically sit atop a dam or spillway where tailwater rarely creates a submerged condition. Because the
gates are in a riverine condition, they are subject to buoyancy forces during flow events that submerge the gates.
Floatation of the gates obstructs the flow, thus increasing the water surface elevation and the inundation limits
during large flood events. The conservation of momentum Eq. (1) was used to estimate the floatation of the gates
for the 100-year and Reach Capacity design events where m1 is an initial mass, v1 is the initial velocity, m2 is the
final mass, and v2 is the final velocity.
m1*∆v1 = -m2*∆v2

(1)

The project did not have the benefit of a hydraulics laboratory scale model to help validate the results; therefore,
performance data from similar gates along the North Canadian River in Oklahoma City were reviewed and
compared with the calculations. The Oklahoma City gates are manufactured by the same gate vendor as Tempe’s
gates and are similar in design, scale, and function. The results indicate buoyancy forces will cause the gates to float
between 7.4 degrees and 9.7 degrees during the design events, and the reviewed performance data from the
Oklahoma City gates is consistent with the findings. Ballasting of the gates is being implemented to help counteract
the buoyancy by placing a cement grout within selected gate chambers. The grout is placed within the upper end
chambers of the gates (see Figure 6) allowing the added weight to transfer to the cylinder connection points without
creating unwanted stresses within the rest of the gate.

Figure 6. Gate Ballasting

4.3. Cylinder and Gate Maintenance
The ability to maintain the lake while performing scheduled and unscheduled cylinder and gate maintenance is a
priority for the City. To achieve this, an upstream dogging system was designed to hold the gates in their full up
(closed) position (see Figure 7). Structurally, the dogging rods mimic the cylinder loading condition, which provides
continuity in the structural design. Each dogging rod position is monitored with a switch to lock out operation of the
respective gate cylinders when the dogging rods are engaged. Additionally, each gate bay can receive a coffer dam
for accessing the upstream side of the gate without draining the lake (see Figure 8).

Figure 7. Gate supported by the dogging rods

Figure 8. Coffer Dam

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents a review of the selection, approach, challenges, and results of designing the hydraulically
operated steel gate system across the ephemeral Salt River necessary to maintain Tempe Town Lake. The selection
of the dam technology considered safety, impacts to the river’s discharge capacity, operational flexibility, cost,
maintenance, and the harsh weather of the Sonoran Desert. Selection and design of the instrumentation balanced the
need to monitor the structure’s health, prevent irreversible damage, and maintain the lake’s normal pool while also
preventing flooding during flow events. The resulting gate system is designed to meet the needs of the City of
Tempe and maintain the value Tempe Town Lake brings to the community.
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